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THE RELATIVE RELEVANCE OF BANKRUPTCY:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR MARTIN
Daniel Keating*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Nathalie Martin has spent a good part of her academic career
“helping consumers avoid the many traps and pitfalls created by the current
consumer credit world . . . .”1 Between her voluminous cutting-edge scholarship
on consumer law issues2 and her many years teaching courses such as
Bankruptcy, Consumer Law, and Financial Literacy, she brings a rare
combination of deep expertise in both bankruptcy and consumer law. Professor
Martin’s passion for and knowledge of the intersection of consumer law and
bankruptcy law are each ably demonstrated in her excellent and thoughtful
article, Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy.
Although lacking Professor Martin’s sophistication on the consumer law
side of things, I nevertheless share her obvious frustration with the economic
and income stratification that we both can see on full display in our society
today. This widening gap between the haves and the have-nots seemingly
worsens with each passing year.3 I also share Professor Martin’s desire to find
solutions to this crisis through some form of intervention, whether that be
legislative, administrative, or market-based. Her article suggests that certain
changes in the Bankruptcy Code (Code) might effectively address some of the
ways that bankruptcy law has failed many economically marginalized debtors.

*
I would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments (some of them quoted in this
response piece) on the issue of the relevance of consumer bankruptcy law today: Darrell Clark, Emily Cohen,
Danielle D’Onfro, Robert Eggmann, David Farrell, Dave Going, Sandra Louis, T.J. Mullin, Judge Barry
Schermer, Wendell Sherk, Judge Kathy Surratt-States, and Cynthia Kern Woolverton. I would also like to thank
my fellow panelists Pamela Foohey, David Lander, and Nathalie Martin for their interesting insights on this
issue.
1
Professor Nathalie Martin, UNIV. OF N.M., http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/martin/index.html.
2
See, e.g., Nathalie Martin & Robert Mayer, What Communities Can Do to Rein In Payday Lending:
Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance Campaigns Through a Texas Lens, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(2017); Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit
Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989 (2015); Nathalie Martin & Max Weinstein,
Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis through Law School Clinics, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 531 (2013).
3
See, e.g., Chad Stone, et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guideto-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality (noting that beginning the 1970s, “[i]ncome growth for
households in the middle and lower parts of the distribution slowed sharply, while incomes at the top continued
to grow strongly.”).
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Because my assignment is to be a commentator on Professor Martin’s article,
I am assuming that my role is primarily to highlight where my views might differ
from hers or where I might add insights that she may have omitted. Having said
that, I want to reiterate at the beginning of my comments that I learned many
valuable new insights from her article, that I thoroughly enjoyed reading it, and
that I agreed with much, if not most, of what she had to say.
Whether or not Professor Martin’s prescriptions for bankruptcy reform will
make bankruptcy more relevant depends a lot on the accuracy of empirical
assumptions and predictions that underlie her article—assumptions about the
characteristics of the current consumer debtor population as well as predictions
about how her reforms would affect the future behavior of both debtors and
creditors. Because I have had so little connection to the real world of consumer
bankruptcy practice, I thought that in preparing my response it would probably
be helpful to me (and ultimately to Professor Martin) to share Professor Martin’s
article with people I know who work in the consumer bankruptcy practice area.
The group from which I sought some “real world” perspective included: two
federal bankruptcy judges, one chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee, one
career law clerk to a federal bankruptcy judge, one former attorney advisor for
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, one bankruptcy
lawyer who does mostly business but some consumer bankruptcy, and four
lawyers who do primarily or exclusively consumer bankruptcy work. I was
fortunate to receive written responses from each member of this group except
for one lawyer who responded to me by phone call. Collectively, these responses
served as a “reality check” to my own reactions to the various proposals put forth
in Professor Martin’s article. Where appropriate, I will note (and even quote)
some of the more insightful comments that I received from this group.
To be clear, I do not pretend that this very informal survey is in any sense an
“empirical study.” Even if I had been afforded much more time than the one
month that I was given to prepare this response, it is highly doubtful that I could
have designed and executed a meaningful empirical study that could have
reliably tested some of the empirical questions raised by Professor Martin’s
article. Be that as it may, even these anecdotal insights that I received from very
experienced professionals in the field proved quite useful to me as I pondered
my own reactions to the proposals contained in the article by Professor Martin.
With those preliminary thoughts out of the way, let me now proceed by first
outlining the two “big picture” concerns that I had with the article and then by
sharing my thoughts and comments on some of Professor Martin’s more specific
proposals for reform.
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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE BIG PICTURE

Even the so-called “big picture” disagreements I have about the article may
go more to the degree of Professor Martin’s claims in the article than to the
essence of what she is asserting. First, I have to quibble with Professor Martin’s
thesis, at least as it is stated in the opening sentence of her article, where she
states, “Consumer bankruptcy has become . . . irrelevant.”4 That is a bold
statement indeed, and I appreciate that we both work in an industry—the legal
academy—where we are taught from a young, professional age to be bold, even
perhaps at the risk of over-claiming. After all, how many untenured professors
write law review articles whose stated goal is to make merely some modest
contribution to the existing literature at the margin rather than to offer an entirely
novel “paradigm-shifting” insight?
While I cannot sign on to Professor Martin’s thesis as stated above, I could
easily be persuaded by a more nuanced statement of the same thesis, perhaps
something along the lines of, “Consumer bankruptcy has become less relevant,”
or “Consumer bankruptcy has become irrelevant for a certain subset of
debtors.”5 What the statistics would show us is that consumer bankruptcy filings
have clearly been on the decline following the passage of Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).6 What the
numbers would also show us, however, is that in the most recent calendar year,
consumer filings in this country well exceeded 500,000, which seems to me a
number large enough to suggest that bankruptcy is still very relevant for at least
a nontrivial number of consumer debtors.7
The cause of the decline in consumer filings may well be due to the features
of the current bankruptcy law that Professor Martin’s article proposes to remedy.

4

Nathalie Martin, Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 581

(2020).
5
As one of my consumer bankruptcy lawyer respondents put it, “I think her article should be called
‘Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy for the Middle Class or Upper Middle Class.’” This lawyer
continued, “In my experience, those who are truly in need of debt relief do not own houses or cars (remember I
live in a city with a strong metro system). Also, nearly all do not have large student loans. I think what she is
really arguing is that bankruptcy is less available for a certain segment of the population that purchased a new
car or a home or purchased an expensive degree.” Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to
author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author).
6
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (2005). Consumer bankruptcy filings were at just over 1.5 million in 2010, but in 2018 had fallen to
about half of that number. See Andrew Keshner, Bankruptcy Filings are at a 10-year Low, but not for the
Reasons You Might Think, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bankruptcyfilings-are-at-a-10-year-low-but-thats-not-necessarily-good-news-2019-01-07.
7
See Keshner, supra note 6.
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I would suggest, however, that there are at least two other contributing factors
to explain the significant drop in filings since BAPCPA. First, the added burdens
to the debtor and the debtor’s attorney of BAPCPA have so increased the cost
of a basic consumer bankruptcy filing that many consumers who might have
otherwise filed bankruptcy before BAPCPA have now been priced out of
bankruptcy relief.8 Second, thanks to the Affordable Care Act (ACA),9 there are
probably fewer debtors than before the ACA who must look to bankruptcy to
discharge significant medical debt. I am not suggesting here that the ACA was
a panacea in this regard, but only that it probably helped reduce the incidence of
the so-called “medical bankruptcy” at the margins.10
In addition to my issue above with the scope of Professor Martin’s thesis,
my second “big picture” question that I have about the theme of Professor
Martin’s article is whether the bankruptcy system is best suited, or even wellsuited, to address the systemic income and wealth inequality that clearly troubles
many of us. My understanding of the role of bankruptcy law in the economy has
always been that bankruptcy is designed to treat the case of a catastrophic
economic disruption for the consumer debtor, with the traditional “big three” of
these disruptions being medical debt, job loss, or divorce.11 Bankruptcy and its
discharge enable an individual who could otherwise be economically selfsustaining to wipe their slate clean with respect to whatever one-time financial
catastrophe has left a sea of debt in its wake. The effect of such a large and
sudden debt is that the individual’s regular income is suddenly unable to keep
up with both debt payments and living expenses each month. If bankruptcy,
however, can discharge this large debt, then the individual is now able to create
a personal budget that will finally leave them in the black financially.
Even though consumer bankruptcy and business bankruptcy are quite
different in many respects, I believe that both types of bankruptcy share a
common core with respect to their role in allowing either an individual or a
business to overcome the effects of a non-recurring but major financial setback.

8

See infra section VI.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2010).
10
See Kari Paul, Medicaid Expansion Saved 50,000 People from Bankruptcy in Two Years,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/medicaid-expansion-saved-50000people-from-bankruptcy-in-2-years-2017-11-07 (According to a study that was conducted in part by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Credit score gains due to Medicaid expansion [under the ACA] led to
50,000 fewer bankruptcies among subprime borrowers in the two years following the reform.”).
11
These were the three main precipitating causes of consumer bankruptcy that were cited in the landmark
book, As We Forgive Our Debtors. See Elizabeth Warren, et al., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).
9
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In the chapter 11 casebook that I currently use for my seminar,12 the co-authors
at the very start of their book present the contrast of two different businesses as
potential candidates for a chapter 11 reorganization. First, we have the Acme
Shoe Company, which currently makes a pair of shoes at a cost of $10 and then
sells each pair for $9.50. Then we have Ernestine and her Copy Shop, a start-up
business that had been quite successful in its early months until a customer
slipped and fell on the premises. The customer got a big tort judgment against
Ernestine’s business and Ernestine had failed to pay her liability insurance,
which meant that the tort judgment was not covered by insurance. The authors
of the casebook pose the question to the students, which of these two companies
is an appropriate candidate for chapter 11 bankruptcy?13
The short answer to that question is of course supposed to be Ernestine and
her Copy Shop. Ernestine’s business has proven that, in the absence of this
massive one-time debt, it can be self-sustaining and is worth more as a goingconcern than it is if liquidated piecemeal. The deeper answer to this question is
that perhaps Acme Shoe Company is also an appropriate candidate for chapter
11. However, in order for Acme Shoe Company to be a viable business even
with the help of chapter 11, the company would need to change the way it does
business so that it can become economically sustainable. Perhaps that would
involve figuring out how to cut some needless costs or otherwise finding ways
to become more efficient and profitable. Perhaps that would mean
manufacturing some new products or expanding into some different geographic
markets. But simply filing chapter 11 bankruptcy with nothing more is not going
to save Acme Shoe Company from its fast-approaching demise.
What concerns me the most about what I see in our country’s current climate
of income stratification is that a large segment of the economically marginalized
population falls into a category that I would describe as “structurally
unsustainable.” In other words, it seems that a significant portion of our lowerwage workers simply do not make enough income at their current positions to
afford what most of us would view as the basic necessities of life: safe housing,
transportation, child care, food and medical care, not to mention certain other
traditional features of middle-class life such as travel, entertainment, a pension,
and money for a child’s college tuition. Bankruptcy, it seems to me, is much
better at dealing with the one-time economic catastrophe than it is at addressing
these cases of structural unsustainability. To better address structural
unsustainability, perhaps we need to look at broader approaches such as income
12
13

See Mark S. Scarberry, et al., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 2012).
Id. at 3–5.
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tax reform, a more robust social safety net, a higher federal minimum wage, a
guaranteed income, federally subsidized housing, and similar programs outside
of the bankruptcy system.
Granted, just because an individual is currently in a state of structural
unsustainability does not mean that they cannot change that, either by their own
efforts, the government’s assistance, or some combination of the two. Just like
Acme Shoe Company can take a hard look at the way it does business to see if
it can change in a way that makes it viable, individuals can potentially change
their own situations through job training, higher education, or even consumer
education that makes them use what little money they have more efficiently. The
hard question for me, however, is whether bankruptcy is the vehicle best
designed for effectively addressing this common category of struggling
consumer in our current economy.
Let me now consider three different (and artificially constructed) categories
of consumer bankruptcy debtors and ask in each case how Professor Martin’s
proposed reforms would make a bankruptcy filing more useful or relevant. For
my Category 1 debtor, I will consider what I think of as the classic candidate for
bankruptcy relief: An individual who could be financially self-sufficient but for
some catastrophic one-time or random financial event, such as medical debt,
temporary job loss, or divorce. This debtor has no student loans and they may or
may not own their own home or their own car, but home or car debt is not their
issue. Rather, it is their inability to pay the non-recurring but large debt that
makes them currently unable to pay their bills and their expenses as they come
due. Their financial situation could best be described as not structurally
unsustainable, but merely temporarily unsustainable.
For this Category 1 debtor, the current consumer bankruptcy laws may
already give them the relief that they need to become financially self-sufficient
once again. It is possible that some of these Category 1 debtors will be forced to
file a chapter 13 case instead of a chapter 7 case due to the means test of
BAPCPA,14 but even a chapter 13 case may ultimately get them out from under
the catastrophic debt which they need to have discharged in order to make their
income and expenses balance out again.
I would submit that for a Category l debtor as I have defined that group,
Professor Martin’s proposed reforms would not make bankruptcy more relevant
for them personally. Because their problem is not rooted in large mortgage

14

See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2019).
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payments and a home of declining value, or large car payments and a car of
declining value, or large student loan payments, they will likely get the relief
they need under current bankruptcy law with an eventual discharge of the
unsecured debt represented by their one-time financial catastrophe.
My Category 2 consumer debtor is one that I have already described. They
fall into my “structurally unsustainable” category. Their problem is that their
current low income simply cannot keep up with the normal expenses of
independent adult living. Perhaps they were able to run up a lot of credit-card
debt in the short-term in order to mask temporarily the structurally unsustainable
nature of their financial situation. And for that, a bankruptcy filing and the
accompanying discharge of such unsecured debt could give them some shortterm relief from their financial struggles. However, that relief by definition
would only be short-term given that I am defining this group of consumer
debtors as simply not making enough income to meet basic expenses even aside
from any one-time or catastrophic debt. For this group of consumer debtors,
neither current bankruptcy law nor Professor Martin’s proposed reforms would
provide much in the way of sustainable relief.
As I think about why bankruptcy is probably not a viable solution for the
structurally unsustainable situations faced by many consumer debtors, I am
reminded of a quote that I include in my Sales casebook15 from Judge Richard
Posner in an opinion he wrote about the unconscionability doctrine in UCC
Article 2.16 Judge Posner was reflecting on the limited utility of the
unconscionability doctrine to help economically marginalized buyers: “Since
the law of contracts cannot compel the making of contracts on terms favorable
to one party, but can only refuse to enforce contracts with unfavorable terms, it
is not an institution that is well designed to rectify inequalities in wealth.”17 I
would say essentially the same thing about bankruptcy as applied to a consumer
debtor who simply does not make enough income to meet basic living expenses:
Since bankruptcy cannot compel employers to pay a higher wage for the
consumer debtor, but can only discharge their past debts once every eight years,
it is not an institution that is well designed to rectify inequalities in wealth (or
income).
My Category 3 group of consumer debtors would be the ones who would
most stand to benefit from Professor Martin’s proposed reforms. I am defining
these debtors as individuals who are unable to meet their basic living expenses
15
16
17

DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (7th ed. 2020).
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012).
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986).
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mainly due to large mortgage payments, large car payments, and large student
loan payments. In order for this group to benefit from Professor Martin’s
proposals, they would need to be in a situation where the secured loan on their
car or home is currently undersecured by some significant amount. Otherwise,
the strip down benefit that they would achieve in a chapter 13 filing would not
serve to lower their payments. In other words, if their home value or car value
currently equaled or exceeded the outstanding debt for that collateral, then they
could not expect bankruptcy to bring them financial relief through lower
monthly payments.
For my Category 3 debtors who are primarily burdened by large student-loan
payments, Professor Martin’s proposal would clearly seem to help them. The
marginal benefit of that help would have to be measured against what the
consumer debtor could already qualify for by way of nonbankruptcy incomedriven student loan repayment plans.18 A bankruptcy discharge of student loan
debt has two benefits to the consumer as compared to an income-driven
repayment plan outside of bankruptcy: first, in the short term, the debtor who
gets a bankruptcy discharge would not have to make even the lower-thanstandard payment required by a nonbankruptcy income-driven repayment plan;
and second, in the long term, the debtor with a student-loan discharge would not
need to worry about the huge tax burden that comes with forgiveness at the end
of the income-driven repayment period. Under Professor Martin’s proposal,
consumer debtors would need to wait seven years from the point that they begin
payments to qualify for the discharge that she recommends, but they could at
least qualify for the all-important bankruptcy discharge at that time.
In order for us to meaningfully address the questions of whether, and to what
extent, Professor Martin’s proposals would make bankruptcy relevant, or more
relevant, we would need to have a sense of the relative number of consumer
debtors that fall within these three categories. Even if we had the time and
resources to do a detailed empirical study, I suspect that the artificial boundaries
of my categories would become quickly apparent, and most real-life debtors
would probably fit some combination of the three categories as I have outlined
them above. Nevertheless, the important unknown here for me is to what extent
the population of debtors today leans toward the characteristics of my Category
3 debtor. It would be to that extent—to the extent that today’s debtor population
resembles my Category 3 debtor—that Professor Martin’s proposals would

18
See generally The Road to Zero: A Strategic Approach to Student Loan Repayment, ACCESSLEX INST.
(2020), https://www.accesslex.org/RoadToZero.
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make consumer bankruptcy more relevant than current bankruptcy law for the
overall group of more than half a million annual consumer bankruptcy filers.
II. LIEN-STRIPPING FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND CAR LOANS
I am generally in agreement with Professor Martin’s proposal to allow lien
strip downs for a debtor’s primary home mortgage or for a debtor’s car loans.
As a bankruptcy judge friend of mine put it so succinctly, if the lender were
forced to do a foreclosure sale outside of bankruptcy on the home or car, all they
would get in cash is the value of the collateral anyway.19 If the debtor wanted to
file bankruptcy immediately after such a foreclosure sale they could thereby
discharge the unsecured deficiency claim, if any, and achieve the functional
equivalent of a mortgage strip down. The big difference, of course, between
what a lender gets outside of bankruptcy with a state-law foreclosure in this
context vs. what the lender gets in a chapter 13 case is the timing of payment:
immediately in a state-law foreclosure vs. over a five-year period in a chapter
13 plan.
Having stated my general agreement with this lien-strip down proposal of
Professor Martin’s, let me just add a few thoughts on the subject. First, the
marginal benefit of this proposal will be a function not only of the particular
debtor’s circumstances (see my three debtor categories above), but also of the
residential real estate market. Three of my small sample of consumer debtor
attorneys opined without my asking that in the current residential real estate
market, a mortgage loan strip down would not be meaningful for most debtors
who come to see them and are currently paying home mortgages. As one
consumer bankruptcy lawyer put it,
The subprime market that existed prior to the crash does not exist in
this environment. Lending has in fact tightened with underwriting, all
but eliminating the ‘no doc’ and inflated valuations the country
experienced in the early 2000s. The national delinquency rate is less
than 4% while Missouri’s default rate is at approximately 1%.20

Presumably when the next recession hits and real estate prices drop, this
proposal of Professor Martin’s would have greater relevance to at least those

19

Email from Anonymous Bankruptcy Judge to author (Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with author).
This lawyer noted that “Delinquency rates have fallen to their lowest rate in 25 years, and on a yearover-year basis, total mortgage delinquencies decreased for all loans outstanding. The delinquency rate
decreased by 56 basis points for conventional loans, decreased 74 basis points for FHA loans, and decreased 23
basis points for VA loans.” Seth Welborn, Where Mortgage Delinquency Rates Are Improving Most, DS NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://dsnews.com/daily-dose/11-15-2019/delinquency-rate-by-loan-type.
20
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debtors who file bankruptcy and want to keep their homes with potentially
reduced monthly payments.
My second observation about this lien-strip down proposal is that it would
add a nontrivial valuation issue to any consumer case where the debtor sought
the benefits of strip down. This was a point specifically raised by one of my
bankruptcy lawyer respondents.21 Granted, residential real estate valuation is not
nearly as complicated as is commercial real estate valuation. Nevertheless, the
valuation range of any home at any given time can be quite broad. A recent
personal example is that when my own county recently reassessed my home’s
value for property-tax purposes, it claimed that in the two-year interval since the
last assessment the value of my house had risen by forty-seven percent based on
local “comparable” houses that the assessor’s office had compiled. When I
challenged that assessment on appeal with my own list of comparable houses,
the county reduced its reassessment to a much more modest six percent increase
over its previously assessed value at the last two-year interval. The point is, even
when it comes to residential real estate values, there is a wide range within which
the two sides can litigate about valuation with potentially many thousands of
dollars at stake. That, in turn, could add cost and complication to a consumer
bankruptcy case as compared to the current no-valuation setting.22
A third point that was raised by two of my consumer bankruptcy attorney
friends is that even in the absence of this lien-strip down reform proposal, a
clever debtor’s lawyer can often achieve the benefits of a lien strip down during
a time of falling real estate prices. One lawyer focused on the language of the
current anti-strip down provisions in chapter 13 cases, in which only mortgages
that are “secured only by the principal residence” are denied strip down
treatment.23 This lawyer explained, “Since most Deeds of Trust get an
assignment of insurance proceeds in the event of a fire, a creative judge could
easily view that as extra collateral and allow a cramdown. I did this
once . . . when [the mortgage lender] refinanced a home and took chicken coops
also—[it] saved my guy $60,000 plus interest over time! Got to read those Deeds
of Trust and think outside the box!”24

21

Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 23, 2020) (on file with author).
A debtor’s home valuation can still become an issue in a chapter 13 case even without the strip down
possibility. The bankruptcy court must determine the debtor’s equity in their home as part of a determination of
how much non-exempt property the debtor owns in a chapter 13 case. However, the valuation stakes in those
cases tend not to be high given that the typical debtor’s equity in their home does not exceed the relevant
homestead exemption amount and thus would not be available for creditors anyway.
23
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2019).
24
Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author).
22
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Another bankruptcy attorney friend of mine suggested an alternative way to
qualify for strip down even under the current bankruptcy laws: “Regarding the
strip off/strip down of real estate used as a residence: I never understood why a
debtor did not simply move in with the in-laws for a few months and establish a
different residence prior to the bankruptcy. Then, do the strip off of the second
mortgage or the strip down of the first mortgage in bankruptcy. Then move back
after discharge.”25
On the subject of BAPCPA’s rule that eliminated car-lien strip downs for
any car bought within 910 days of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing,26 one
consumer bankruptcy lawyer that I contacted suggested that Professor Martin’s
proposed reform (which I also support) might not actually put more money in
the debtor’s pocket in many cases that he has recently seen: “I don’t think this
[proposed repeal by Professor Martin of BAPCPA’s anti-strip down rule for car
loans] is going to make or break the system as such. With the ‘typical’ middle
class Ch. 13 case, it simply caused a reduction in the unsecured dividend in order
to pay for the 910-day car. It was a wealth transfer within the estate but it has
typically meant a minimal increase in the actual payment required of the debtor
into the estate.”27
That same attorney, however, believes that Professor Martin’s proposal on
stripping down car loans could be significant over time:
I suspect that [the lack of impact noted above] will change in the
coming years. We’re seeing auto loans that extend well beyond the
standard 5-year term to deal with high MSRPs [manufacturer’s
suggested retail price], far more than typical consumers can reasonably
afford. The vanishing middle class is causing this creative financing,
so we get 8-year car loans, which include a chunk of negative equity
to boot.
The means test doesn’t account for that well (we only get a deduction
driven by 60-months of the auto debt service) and cramdown on those
very costly cars could be critical to making any plan work while
retaining the car. We can currently set up the plan to pay those longterm loans on a conduit basis—just keep up the contract payments for
5-years—but at the contract subprime interest rates instead of ‘Till’
rates28 [generally much lower than subprime interest rates]. That may
25

Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2019).
27
Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with author).
28
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479–80 (2004) (holding that the interest rate to which a
secured creditor is entitled in a chapter 13 plan is not the creditor’s contract rate but instead a market rate of
interest equal to the prime rate plus some small additional ‘risk factor’ to reflect the particular debtor’s level of
26
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leave nothing to cope with mortgage arrearage or other things we have
to pay under the plan. At the very least, it would be nice to be able to
‘term-out’ such car loans with a reduced interest rate and not be limited
to five years [the usual length of the Chapter 13 plan]. That might be
more valuable than a repeal of 910-day protections on the valuation,
in the long term, given the spiraling cost of new cars.29

III. STUDENT LOANS
Whether or not bankruptcy is the best vehicle with which to address the
student loan problem, I think that most people would agree that the student-loan
debt problem is a growing economic crisis that is currently in search of
solutions.30 The student-loan crisis reminds me a lot of the underfunded pension
crisis that was fueled by the passage of ERISA and the federal government’s
guarantee of employer-sponsored defined-benefit pension plans.31 Both
situations present classic examples of economic bubbles that are bound to burst.
In my article on the federal pension guarantee, I called this pattern “deferred
maintenance”—where someone gets a benefit now by making a promise to pay
someone later—and moral hazard, since the federal government’s role as
guarantor in both situations means that defined-benefit pensions were promised
by employers and student loans were made by lenders that otherwise might not
have been promised or made but for the existence of the solvent third-party
guarantor.32
In both cases, the federal government finally realized at some point in the
process that it had overpromised and that it needed to do something to help
manage its likely losses. In the pension arena, the scope of the defined-benefit
pension guarantees by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
eventually had to be scaled back.33 With student loan guarantees, the federal
government continues to struggle with how to eliminate participation by certain
colleges and universities (often for-profit) whose graduates have historically low

risk to the lender).
29
Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with author).
30
See Daniel M. Johnson, What Will It Take to Solve the Student Loan Crisis, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
23, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/what-will-it-take-to-solve-the-student-loan-crisis (estimating current student
loan debt at just under $1.6 trillion).
31
See generally Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
65 (1991).
32
Id.
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See id. at 88–89.
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repayment rates, while still keeping the program generally available to the next
generation of college students.34
The main limit of bankruptcy as a solution to either of these two federal
financial crises, at least from the perspective of the federal treasury, is that
bankruptcy fails to put any new money on the table. In theory, bankruptcy can
be helpful to the debtor in each of these two situations—the employer with the
underfunded defined-benefit pensions and the consumer with unpaid student
loans—if it allows the debtor to transfer their liability onto the federal
government’s guarantee. Thus, in bankruptcy a broader student-loan discharge
would amount to a wealth transfer from each debtor who gets the student-loan
discharge to federal taxpayers as a group. In the corporate pension arena, this
has worked to some degree for corporations that were able to use chapter 11
bankruptcy to discharge some or all of their defined-benefit pension liability and
then emerge with a much cleaner balance sheet for the future.35 For individual
debtors looking for similar relief in the student loan arena, the outcomes have
been much less favorable, thanks to the current “undue hardship” standard for
discharge that is found in § 523(a)(8).36
I am inclined to favor Professor Martin’s proposal on student loan discharge,
and I definitely favor it over a more universal nonbankruptcy loan forgiveness
program such as that being proposed by certain presidential candidates.37 The
biggest problem that I have with a nonbankruptcy loan forgiveness across the
board is that it would sweep within its scope many debtors who could easily
afford to repay their loans. I am thinking here of highly paid professionals who
borrowed to attend medical school, law school, or business school. These
wealthy debtors would potentially receive the same debt forgiveness as debtors
who worked hard to earn degrees that were not marketable and who now struggle
with limited incomes to repay their large student loan debts. One major
advantage to Professor Martin’s proposal (unlike universal forgiveness
programs outside of bankruptcy) is that it would require seven years of
repayment by the debtor plus surrender of all the debtor’s non-exempt assets (or
34
See, e.g., Annie Nova, Bill Would Make For-Profit Colleges Ineligible for Federal Student Loans,
CNBC (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/bill-would-make-for-profit-schools-inelgible-forfinancial-aid.html.
35
See, e.g., Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 35, at 65 (describing the 1986 chapter 11 filing of the
LTV Corporation).
36
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019).
37
See Adam S. Minsky, How Do the Warren and Sanders Student Loan Forgiveness Plans Compare?,
FORBES (June 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2019/06/27/how-do-warrens-and-sandersstudent-loan-forgiveness-plans-compare/#5a8a4c318c4f (noting that Sanders’ plan is a total forgiveness plan
whereas Warren’s plan has various limitations).
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its equivalent value in chapter 13 plan payments) as the cost of receiving the
student loan discharge.38
The other benefit to Professor Martin’s proposal as compared to
nonbankruptcy forgiveness programs is that it would probably be less costly to
taxpayers. But even with Professor Martin’s proposal, my one hesitation in
endorsing it without qualification is the uncertainty of its cost. Given the
hundreds of billions of dollars in outstanding student loan debt, how much of
that would get discharged under Professor Martin’s bankruptcy reform and thus
get written off the federal treasury’s bottom line? That is one of those critical
empirical questions for which we just don’t know the answer.
On the subject of student loans, I want to close by sharing ideas that were
sent to me by two of the people that I contacted in the bankruptcy field. One
bankruptcy lawyer that I know suggested to me that the way to rein in the student
loan crisis, at least going forward, is to require that colleges and universities
where students attend must sign on as guarantors of any student loans taken out
by their students.39 This would, he said, address the “Bennett Principle”
mentioned in Professor Martin’s article. That is where former Secretary of
Education William J. Bennett complained that colleges were able to raise their
tuition at artificially high rates only because of the assurance that students could
pay those higher tuition costs thanks to the federally guaranteed student loans.40
While I appreciate how that might address the arguable moral hazard that
universities have under the current system, I think that I had better not
wholeheartedly support this idea, at least given the nature and identity of my
current employer!
Another of my respondents from the bankruptcy field thought that many
debtors might be able to improve their current situation regarding their student
loans if only they had appreciated prior to filing bankruptcy what rights they
already had under income-driven repayment programs:
I also think that a mechanism for communication between lenders and
student loan debtors before bankruptcy would eliminate lawsuits in
bankruptcy and in some instances the filing of bankruptcy cases in the
first instance. All too often a debtor does not learn of (or understand)

38
Under chapter 13, the “best interests of creditors test” under § 1325(a)(4) says that no chapter 13 plan
can be confirmed over a creditor’s objection if that creditor does not receive at least as much as the creditor
would in a chapter 7 liquidation of the same debtor. And a chapter 7 liquidation of any debtor would require that
the debtor give up all of their non-exempt property to pay pre-petition creditors.
39
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer (Jan. 15, 2020).
40
Martin, Relevance, supra note 5, at 608.
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nonbankruptcy student loan repayment options until after filing an
adversary proceeding in his bankruptcy case and being connected with
lender’s counsel.41

IV. DISCHARGE HEARINGS
I agree with Professor Martin that there is an unfortunate but significant
psychological or shame-based aspect to the bankruptcy process, and that in a
perfect world a debtor would have an opportunity to tell someone their side of
the story. I truly believe that people get better and feel better when they have an
opportunity to tell their story. Based on what I heard from my professional
friends in the consumer bankruptcy field, however, it seems that the better forum
in which a debtor can tell their story is not the former discharge hearing, but
rather the offices of their own bankruptcy attorney. I received more than one
impassioned response that roundly applauded the demise of the discharge
hearing.
One attorney who has been doing exclusively consumer bankruptcy filings
for almost fifty years recalls:
I well remember those [discharge] hearings. I used to send letters to
other lawyers and offer to attend for them, meet their clients, and tell
what was happening along with my clients, of course, at $10 a head. I
always made an extra $40 that way. You had to attend the hearing with
your clients, of course, as otherwise your clients would not understand
what was going on and if there was a debt to be reaffirmed, you already
had to be there lest things get confused.
As a consequence, your clients lost two to four hours of work earning
money, had to pay for parking and the lawyer had to charge for going,
also. Total waste of time. I agree that folks need to feel good about
what they are doing. But this is the job of the debtor’s attorney. You
need to explain to folks that filing is designed to give them an
opportunity for a fresh start. That the guys who drafted the
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, Jim Madison, and all
the [founders] wanted the U.S. to be a place of fresh starts. That people
like Harry Truman, Walt Disney, and others have filed. That you
cannot walk forward in life while kicking yourself in the butt!
If you do this, your clients will not be happy they are seeing you,
obviously, any more than a person with cancer is happy to see the
doctor, but they will be happy that they live someplace where folks
can get a fresh start (unlike some places in the world) and will
41

Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 14, 2020) (on file with author).

KEATING_7.15.20

640

7/15/2020 4:01 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

appreciate that brave men have gone to the death to keep it that way
on a variety of levels, not just bankruptcy. Better this extra fifteen
minutes in the office than wasting two to four hours of their time later
plus pay extra fees for the lawyer to sit there trying to think of
something else while the judge drones on.42

Another lawyer with three decades in consumer bankruptcy practice echoed
those sentiments about the discharge hearing:
I agree a lot of my clients are relieved to finally be able to tell their
story. A discharge hearing might, in the right circumstances, be a nice
forum for them to celebrate their fresh start. But I think it’s likely to
be a bad idea as implemented. First, if it’s mandatory, it will cost them
time away from work. They can’t afford that. They just can’t. These
are folks who are often working two jobs. They work a couple hours
of their time to pay for parking downtown. And then give up a couple
more hours to just be there.
Second, there are just enough judges who think consumers ought to be
punished for being bankrupt that I dread having my clients ever having
to appear before them. (Not in [the Eastern District of Missouri]
thankfully.)
Third, I currently can tell most clients they only have to go to court
once, they never even have to see the (fearsome) judge in most cases,
and at the end they don’t have to go back down there to bend their knee
and apologize to anyone to get their fresh start. They genuinely fear
any public appearance as part of their bankruptcy case. Telling them
they can keep their head down, collect this entitlement and move on
with their life is what they crave.
What we’re talking about here is folks need to have a sympathetic
counselor. That’s my job, not [the bankruptcy judge’s]. I can usually
look at an intake questionnaire of three pages and know what
happened. Not the nitty-gritty details but the big picture. But I have to
give them five to ten minutes to just tell their story and get it off their
chests and then they’re ready to begin working with me. I agree with
[Professor Martin] that they need it but I don’t think it belongs in the
courthouse. Plus, if it’s a court hearing, lawyers ought to go. That’s an
additional cost to the client that they cannot afford.43

Finally, a former bankruptcy attorney who spent many years as a federal
bankruptcy law clerk, as an attorney in private practice and then as an attorney

42
43
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advisor for the bankruptcy court remembers her judge talking about these
hearings and how perfunctory they were when they used to be required:
Steps to force debtors to attend discharge hearings are not, in my
opinion, practical nor would they be effective in giving debtors the
desired feeling of being heard and encouraged on their discharge. First,
courts do not have the capacity to conduct individual hearings on
discharge so the process would become an exercise in convening a
group and conveying a common message. Debtors would actually be
burdened to take time from work to attend such a hearing. Rather, I
think care for debtor concerns is best met by their counsel as a matter
of legal ethics and duty to be responsive to clients. I do not know any
instance when a debtor who wants to speak to the court has not been
allowed to speak and when speaking has not been made to feel heard.
Counsel simply needs to ask for such an opportunity at a scheduled
hearing. Legislating care and compassion does not work.44

V. EFFICIENCY
Professor Martin did not focus much of her reform proposals on the
increased time and cost that BAPCPA created as potential barriers to
bankruptcy’s current relevance to the average consumer. Nevertheless, those
were both common (if unprompted) themes of the comments that I received from
the people I contacted who work in the consumer bankruptcy field. A number of
respondents noted how the added costs of BAPCPA may have priced some
potential consumer bankruptcy filers out of the market altogether. One of my
bankruptcy judge respondents observed:
[F]ilings are and have been down since 2005 for some of the reasons
stated by Prof. Martin in this article, but there are also other reasons,
such as limited lending by banks and other financial institutions and
the increased cost of filing consumer bankruptcy (i.e. increase in
attorney’s fees due to additional attorney work required under
BAPCPA, cost for credit counseling and financial management
courses).45

An attorney with three decades of experience representing consumer debtors
echoed those sentiments:
I believe a growing impediment to relief—and thus making
bankruptcy irrelevant to consumers—is the growing cost of it.

44
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Structurally, BAPCPA created a tax payable to me for collecting a lot
more data, providing more docs, and dealing with more risks. The
AO’s last couple of revisions to the official forms have not exactly
reduced that tax either. They’re horrendous and burdensome without
any offsetting benefit at all. So one of the effects of that tax coupled
with the decline of the middle class and the absence of disposable
income is the problem of actually getting anything filed. Just calculate
how many hours the median Missourian must work—effectively for
me and the court—in order to get a case filed. Ignoring any other costs
of their life. If we’re charging them $1,000 plus a $335 filing fee, it’s
insurmountable for many lower-income folks without family or
savings. Pro se or pro bono services are not able to cover the gap in
affordability. And pro se systems are downright dangerous in places
with weak exemptions like Missouri.46

Another attorney respondent with almost five decades of practicing consumer
bankruptcy law was even more blunt in his assessment of the inefficiencies
brought about by BAPCPA:
The first thing we should consider when making any changes in the
law is how do we make it faster, cheaper, and easier. The current law
has slowed things down and raised the cost of doing business greatly,
all to no benefit to anyone. Fees have gone up from $175 to $750 a
case and we, as lawyers, made more money when it was $175 than
now and the clients are not getting any better results either!47

A chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee who handles hundreds of cases each
year cited BAPCPA’s means test as creating new cost-heavy barriers for
consumer debtors with no corresponding benefit to anyone in the bankruptcy
system:
I for one think that the Means Test is worthless. The idea behind the
Means Test of course is to force the abusive debtor from chapter 7 into
chapter 13. However, these days where you have 0% chapter 13 plans
or chapter 13 plans where a small amount is paid to the unsecured
creditors, forcing someone into chapter 13 really does not help the
creditors but simply punishes the debtor. The old section 707(b)
[dismissal for abuse of the bankruptcy process] was an effective tool
to police the system. In fact, it seemed to me to give more leeway to
the U.S. Trustee to pursue a 707(b) rather than the formulaic Means
Test. In some jurisdictions the U.S. Trustee takes the position that if
one passes the Means Test they will not look at a traditional 707(b). In
addition, the Means Test is unfair in that there are different median
46
47
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incomes and different standard exemptions from state to state. If we
went back to the old system, I think there is more flexibility.48

Besides the means test, the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling and postbankruptcy financial management classes required by BAPCPA were cited by
many of my respondents from practice as needlessly adding to the time and cost
of a typical consumer bankruptcy filing.
One veteran consumer bankruptcy lawyer faulted the general “one size fits
all” nature of such required courses as being not very helpful to most consumer
debtors:
I used to think [that more expansive consumer education would be
useful], but the studies more recently seem to say that most such
programs are simply not preparing consumers for the lending
environment we’re in now. Some of the specialized programs show
results—like the programs directed at new home buyers. I suspect that
there’s good reason for this. Targeted education related to a specific
loan product that someone is seriously thinking about using will get
focused attention from the student. A discussion about how daily
interest loans work and that it is a dangerous product, taken a couple
years before the borrower walks into a friendly neighborhood finance
store, was probably a complete waste of that person’s time. They won’t
even recall what questions they should be asking. I don’t. And I’ve
been doing this for 30 years.
The same is true of most budgeting courses. The only people who can
gain much from education about budgeting are high-income folks who
somehow keep piling up credit card debt anyway because they have
no conception of how to say ‘no’ to new fixed costs in their life. The
low-income folks learn from hard, painful experience to budget or they
go hungry. The middle class usually grasps the principles of budgeting
but rarely have income that consistently keeps up with their
status . . . they spend to try to maintain a standard of living that most
of us consider reasonable.
I just don’t think any education program I’ve heard about will really
work unless it is focused on a desired transaction or specific goal. Then
it seems to ‘take.’ But we just have not found the tools for broad
consumer finance education yet. And I feel like such proposals will
inherently be a taxpayer cost. In which case, you will have most cashstrapped communities looking for ‘free’ programs which, in turn, will
come gift-wrapped from the industry. And while I suspect Jamie

48
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Dimon49 could probably be counted on to put together a largely
unbiased program (although not recommending my services), I have
very little expectation that Freedom Debt Relief (the biggest debt
settlement operator) would miss the opportunity to market itself.50

Another multi-decade practitioner also had little good to say about how these
debtor education requirements have worked out in practice:
The current requirement of two classes is an expensive total waste of
time. Clients are much better buying shoes for the kids than paying for
time-wasting classes. Also, they will get more benefit out of watching
re-runs of Roseanne than spending two to four hours on the computer
effectively being told they do not have enough money to live on. Also,
the classes smack of cultural imperialism, I think, with ‘know-it-alls’
telling working people how to live their lives.51

A bankruptcy judge echoed the sentiments of these two lawyers:
[I believe that] other barriers to bankruptcy access, particularly for the
average and marginalized consumer, [include] the pre-petition credit
counseling requirement and barrier to discharge of the post-petition
financial management requirement. Elimination of these two
requirements should be included in any proposal to provide better
access to the average consumer, in that these requirements can be
detrimental to bankruptcy filers, often resulting in dismissal of cases
shortly after filing or closing of cases without a discharge, and are an
additional cost, requiring additional time by the debtor and they really
serve no purpose.52

A chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee distinguished between the relative
value of the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement and the postbankruptcy financial management classes that debtors must take to qualify for
discharge under BAPCPA:
What I find from my clients and from debtors for whom I am their
chapter 13 or chapter 7 trustee is that very little is attained by the
debtors in pre-bankruptcy credit counseling. However, I have had a
number of debtors comment that the post-bankruptcy financial
management is of service. Accordingly, it seems to me that the prebankruptcy credit counseling is doing nothing more than providing a
logistic impediment for consumers to file bankruptcy and really doing

49
50
51
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no good whereas the post-bankruptcy financial management actually
has benefit.53

One long-time bankruptcy lawyer disagreed with the others in my group of
respondents on the costs and benefits of the education requirements, having
concluded from his experience that probably the benefits justify the costs:
In my opinion the BAPCPA-required classes for bankruptcy filing and
for a discharge are not a barrier. They cost about $50 for both classes
and you pay once—before you file. Debtors can take them online or
over the telephone. I bet it takes 20 minutes for each class. I have had
some debtor clients say that the class helps. It is not a total waste of
time.54

CONCLUSION
Professor Martin’s article is a provocative and thoughtful exploration into
the ways that the bankruptcy system could be improved to address some of the
most vexing problems that our society faces today in an era of increasing wealth
disparity. Although I did not agree entirely with all of her proposals for reform,
even those with which I disagreed gave me new insights and new food for
thought on issues that are clearly important to the overall bankruptcy system as
it operates in practice today. Probably my biggest question about the overall
theme of the article is whether bankruptcy, as opposed to broader nonbankruptcy
solutions, is the most appropriate vehicle for addressing these systemic income
and wealth imbalances that we face as a nation. As I suggested earlier in my
response, the answer to that question is to a large extent an empirical one that
depends on the circumstances and attributes of the typical consumer bankruptcy
debtor. Whatever the empirical data might end up telling us about the likely
efficacy of Professor Martin’s various proposals, I am confident that her article
is an important contribution to the growing literature on how bankruptcy might
be used to ameliorate certain of our country’s current economic inequities.
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